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Abstract
A general-purpose method to mechanically transform system require-
ments into a provably equivalent model has yet to appear. Such a method
represents a necessary step toward high-dependability system engineering
for numerous possible application domains, including distributed software
systems, sensor networks, robot operation, complex scripts for spacecraft in-
tegration and testing, and autonomous systems. Currently available tools and
methods that start with a formal model of a system and mechanically pro-
duce a provably equivalent implementation are valuable but not sufﬁcient.
The “gap” that current tools and methods leave unﬁlled is that their formal
models cannot be proven to be equivalent to the system requirements as orig-
inated by the customer. For the classes of systems whose behavior can be
described as a ﬁnite (but signiﬁcant) set of scenarios, we offer a method for
mechanically transforming requirements (expressed in restricted natural lan-
guage, or in other appropriate graphical notations) into a provably equivalent
formal model that can be used as the basis for code generation and other
transformations.
1 Introduction
Complex systems in general cannot attain high dependability without addressing
the crucial remaining open issues of software dependability. The need for ultra-
high dependability systems increases continually, along with a correspondingly
increasing need to ensure correctness in system development. By “correctness,”
we mean that the implemented system is equivalent to the requirements, and that
this equivalence can be proved mathematically.
Development of a system that will have a high level of reliability requires the
developer to represent the system as a formal model that can be proven to be cor-
rect. Through the use of currently available tools, the model can then be automat-
ically transformed into code with minimal or no human intervention to reduce the
chance of inadvertent introduction of errors by developers. Automatically produc-
ing the formal model from customer requirements—which, as a general capability,
is unavailable today—would further reduce the chance of insertion of errors by
developers.
Available system development tools and methods that are based on formal
models provide neither automated generation of the models from requirements nor
automated proof of correctness of the models. Therefore, today there is no auto-
mated, generally applicable means to produce a system—or even a procedure—
that is a provably correct implementation of the customer’s requirements. Further-
more, requirements engineering as a discipline has yet to produce an automated,
mathematics-based process for requirements validation.
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2 Problem Statement
Automatic code generation from requirements has been the ultimate objective of
software engineering almost since the advent of high-level programming languages,
and calls for a “requirements-based programming” capability have become deafen-
ing1. Several tools and products exist in the marketplace today for automatic code
generation from a given model; however, they typically generate code, portions of
which are never executed, or portions of which cannot be justiﬁed from either the
requirements or the model. Moreover, existing tools do not and cannot overcome
the fundamental inadequacy of all currently available automated development ap-
proaches, which is that they include no means to establish a provable equivalence
between the requirements stated at the outset and either the model or the code they
generate.
Traditional approaches to automatic code generation, including those embod-
ied in commercial products such asMatlab [Mat00], in system development toolsets
such as the B-Toolkit [LH96] or the VDM++ toolkit [IFA00], or in academic re-
search projects, presuppose the existence of an explicit (formal) model of reality
that can be used as the basis for subsequent code generation, as shown in Fig-
ure 1(a). While such an approach is reasonable, the advantages and disadvantages
of the various modeling approaches used in computing are well known, and certain
models can serve well to highlight certain issues while suppressing other, less-
relevant details [Par95]. The converse is also true. Certain models of reality, while
successfully detailing many of the issues of interest to developers, can fail to cap-
ture some important issues, or perhaps even the most important issues. Existing
reverse-engineering approaches suffer from a similar plight. In typical approaches,
such as the one illustrated in Figure 1(b), a model is extracted from an existing
system and is then represented in various ways, for example as a digraph [McL92].
The re-engineering process then involves using the resulting representation as the
basis for code generation, as above.
2.1 Speciﬁcations, Models, and Designs
The model on which automatic code generation is based is referred to as a de-
sign, or more correctly, a design speciﬁcation. There is typically a mismatch be-
tween the design and the implementation (sometimes termed the “speciﬁcation-
implementation gap”) in that the process of going from a suitable design to an
implementation involves many practical decisions that must be made by the au-
1Pers. Comm.: Comments made during presentation at “Formal Approaches to Complex
Software Systems” panel session at ISoLA-04 First International Conference on Leveraging Ap-
plications of Formal Methods, Paphos, Cyprus, 31 October 2004.
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(a) traditional development process
(b) reverse engineering process
Requirements
Documentation
Requirements
Documentation
Figure 1: (a) The traditional software development process from requirements to
code. (b) The reverse engineering process from code to a system description.
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tomated tool used for code generation without any clear-cut justiﬁcations, other
than the predetermined implementation decisions of the tool designers. There is a
more problematic “gap,” termed the “analysis-speciﬁcation gap,” that emphasizes
the problem of capturing requirements and adequately representing them in a spec-
iﬁcation that is clear, concise, and complete. This speciﬁcation must be formal, or
proof of correctness is impossible [Bau80].
Unfortunately, many are reluctant to embrace formal speciﬁcation techniques,
believing them to be difﬁcult to use and apply [Hal90] [BH95], despite many in-
dustrial success stories [HB95] [HB99]. Our experience at NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) has been that while engineers are happy to write descrip-
tions as natural language scenarios, or even using semi-formal notations such as
UML use cases, they are loath to undertake formal speciﬁcation. However, absent
a formal speciﬁcation of the system under consideration, there is no possibility of
determining any level of conﬁdence in the correctness of an implementation. More
importantly, we must ensure that this formal speciﬁcation fully, completely, and
consistently captures the prescribed requirements. We cannot expect requirements
to be perfect, complete, and consistent from the outset, which is why it is even
more important to have a formal speciﬁcation, which can highlight errors, omis-
sions, and conﬂicts. The formal speciﬁcation must also reﬂect changes and updates
from system maintenance, as well as changes and compromises in requirements,
so that it remains an accurate representation of the system throughout the system’s
lifecycle.
2.2 A Novel Approach
Our approach involves providing a mathematically tractable round-trip engineering
approach to system development. The approach described herein is provisionally
named R2D2C (“Requirements to Design to Code”).
In this approach, engineers (or others) may write speciﬁcations as scenarios
in constrained (domain-speciﬁc) natural language, or in a range of other notations
(including UML use cases). These will be used to derive a formal model (Fig-
ure 2) that is guaranteed to be equivalent to the requirements stated at the outset,
and which subsequently will be used as a basis for code generation. The formal
model can be expressed using a variety of formal methods. Currently, we are using
CSP, Hoare’s language of Communicating Sequential Processes [Hoa78] [Hoa85],
which is suitable for various types of analysis and investigation, and as the basis for
fully formal implementations, as well as for use in automated test case generation,
etc.
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Figure 2: The R2D2C approach, generating a formal model from requirements and
producing code from the formal model, with automatic reverse engineering.
3 Technical Approach
R2D2C is unique in that it allows for full formal development from the outset, and
maintains mathematical soundness through all phases of the development process,
from requirements through to automatic code generation. The approach may also
be used for reverse engineering, that is, in retrieving models and formal speciﬁca-
tions from existing code, as shown in Figure 2. The approach can also be used to
“paraphrase” (in natural language, etc.) formal descriptions of existing systems. In
addition, the approach is not limited to generating high-level code. It may also be
used to generate business processes and procedures, and we are currently experi-
menting with using it to generate instructions for robotic devices to be used on the
proposed Hubble Robotic Servicing Mission (HRSM). We are also experimenting
with using it as a basis for an expert system veriﬁcation tool, and as a means of
capturing expert knowledge for expert systems. (Such potential applications will
be described in Section 5.)
Section 3.1 describes the approach at a relatively high level. Section 3.2 de-
scribes an intermediate version of the approach, for which we have built a prototype
tool, and with which we have successfully undertaken some examples.
3.1 R2D2C
The R2D2C approach involves a number of phases, which are reﬂected in the
system architecture described in Figure 3. The following describes each of these
phases.
D1 Scenarios Capture: Engineers, end users, and others write scenarios describ-
ing intended system operation. The input scenarios may be represented in a
constrained natural language using a syntax-directed editor, or may be rep-
resented in other textual or graphical forms.
5
M. Hinchey, J. Rash, and C. Rouff
D2 Traces Generation: Traces and sequences of atomic events are derived from
the scenarios deﬁned in D1.
D3 Model Inference: A formal model, or formal speciﬁcation, expressed in CSP,
is inferred by an automatic theorem prover—in this case, ACL2 [KP00]—
using the traces derived in phase 2. A deep2 embedding of the laws of con-
currency [HJ95] in the theorem prover gives it sufﬁcient knowledge of con-
currency and of CSP to perform the inference. The embedding will be the
topic of a future paper.
D4 Analysis: Based on the formal model, various analyses can be performed, us-
ing currently available commercial or public domain tools, and specialized
tools that are planned for development. Because of the nature of CSP, the
model may be analyzed at different levels of abstraction using a variety of
possible implementation environments. This will be the subject of a future
paper.
D5 Code Generation: The techniques of automatic code generation from a suit-
able model are reasonably well understood. The present modeling approach
is suitable for the application of existing code generation techniques, whether
using a tool speciﬁcally developed for the purpose, or existing tools such as
FDR [FSE99], or converting to other notations suitable for code generation
(e.g., converting CSP to B [But99]) and then using the code generating ca-
pabilities of the B Toolkit.
It should be re-emphasized that the “code” generated may be code in a high-
level programming language, low-level instructions for (electro-) mechanical de-
vices, natural-language business procedures and instructions, or the like. As Fig-
ure 4 illustrates, the above process may also be run in reverse:
R1 Model Extraction: Using various reverse engineering techniques [vZ93], a
formal model expressed in CSP may be extracted.
R2 Traces Generation: The theorem prover may be used to automatically gener-
ate traces based on the laws of concurrency and the embedded knowledge of
CSP.
R3 Analysis: Traces may be analyzed, used to check for various conditions, un-
desirable situations arising, etc.
2“Deep” in the sense that the embedding is semantic rather than merely syntactic.
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Figure 3: The entire process with D1 through D5 illustrating the development ap-
proach, and R1 through R4 the reverse engineering.
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Figure 4: Reverse engineering of system using R2D2C.
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R4 Paraphrasing: A description of the system (or system components) may be
retrieved in the desired format (natural language scenarios, UML use cases,
etc.).
Paraphrasing, whereby more understandable descriptions (above and beyond
existing documentation) of existing systems or system components are extracted,
is likely to have useful application in future system maintenance for systems whose
original design documents are lost or systems that have been modiﬁed so much that
the original design and requirements documents do not reﬂect the current system.
3.2 Short-cut R2D2C
The approach described in Section 3.1 is the way that R2D2C is intended to be
applied, from requirements speciﬁcation through code generation. The approach,
however, requires signiﬁcant computing power in the form of an automated theo-
rem prover performing signiﬁcant inferences based on traces input and its “knowl-
edge” of the laws of concurrency. While this is well warranted for certain applica-
tions, it is likely to be beyond the resources of many developers and organizations.
As a practical concession, we also deﬁne a reduced version of R2D2C called the
“shortcut version” (Figure 5), whereby the use of a theorem prover is avoided, yet
without sacriﬁcing high conﬁdence in the validity of the approach. The following
describes each of the phases for the shortcut R2D2C:
S1 Scenarios Capture: As before, intended system behavior is described by sce-
narios input in natural language, or an appropriate graphical or semi-formal
notation.
S2 Translation to Intermediate Notation: Scenarios are translated to an intermedi-
ate notation, termed EzyCSP, which is a simple natural language-like subset
of CSP that can be used to describe a large number of situations and scenar-
ios (recall that scenarios are domain speciﬁc).
S3 Analysis: While far more simple than CSP, EzyCSP allows some simple anal-
yses to be performed.
S4 Implementation in Java: EzyCSP is sufﬁciently simple that it may easily be
translated to Java and executed.
This simpliﬁed or shortcut approach clearly has signiﬁcant disadvantages when
compared to our full approach. First, the correctness of the development process is
contingent on the correctness of both the translation of scenarios to the intermediate
(EzyCSP) notation and the translation of EzyCSP to Java. However, the correctness
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of the translators for these is assured via a proof of correctness undertaken with
the ACL2 theorem prover. Second, we do not obtain, for free, a reverse process
suitable to support reverse and (ultimately) re-engineering; however, a Java-to-
EzyCSP translator would certainly be possible for highly constrained subsets of
Java.
The signiﬁcant advantage of this simpliﬁed approach, however, is that although
a proof of correctness involving a theorem prover is still required, this is required
exactly once and would be performed by the support system developers (presum-
ably expert in the art). This is signiﬁcantly less expensive computationally than
using a theorem prover in the development of each individual application.
S3
Analysis
S4
Implementation
in Java
S2
Translation to
Intermediate
Notation
S1
Scenarios
Capture
Laws of
Concurrency
EzyCSP
Conversion Tool
Java
EzyCSP SpecScenarios
Figure 5: Short cut R2D2C.
4 A Simple Example
The Lights-Out Ground Operating System (LOGOS) is a proof-of-concept NASA
system for automatic control of ground stations when satellites pass overhead and
under their control. The system exhibits both autonomous and autonomic prop-
erties [TRRH04] [THRRar], and operates by having a community of distributed
autonomous software modules work cooperatively to perform the functions pre-
viously undertaken by human operators using traditional software tools, such as
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orbit generators and command sequence planners. A post-implementation formal
speciﬁcation of the system was undertaken in CSP. The interested reader is di-
rected to [RRH00] and [HRR01] for a detailed discussion of our experiences in
applying formal methods to LOGOS. Using CSP, a number of anomalies, conﬂicts,
and omissions in the system were discovered that had not been detected in testing
and/or actual execution. This experience is typical of highly distributed systems,
such as sensor networks or other multi-agent based systems where dependability is
both very important and very difﬁcult to evaluate. The same approach can be used
for space-based wireless sensor network (WSN) systems where a control station
is in charge of several WSNs located on spacecraft in deep space. An example is
the Autonomous NanoTechnology Swarm (ANTS) [CMN+00] mission, which is
at the concept development phase. This mission will send 1,000 pico-class (ap-
proximately 1 kg) spacecraft to explore the asteroid belt. The ANTS spacecraft
will act as a sensor network making observations of asteroids and analyzing their
composition.
4.1 Speciﬁcation of LOGOS
We will not consider the entire LOGOS/ANTS related system here. Although a
relatively small system, it is too extensive to illustrate in its entirety in this report.
Instead, we will take a couple of example agents from the system, and illustrate
their mapping from natural language descriptions through to simple Java imple-
mentations.
Let us ﬁrst illustrate, via a trivial example from a wireless sensor network,
how scenarios map to CSP. Suppose we have the following as part of one of the
scenarios for the system. The elements interacting in the example scenario are the
WSN Monitoring Agent (WSNMA), the Fault Resolution Agent (FIRE), and the
Trending Agent (TREND).
if the WSN Monitoring Agent receives a “fault” advisory from the
WSN, the agent sends the fault to the Fault Resolution Agent
OR
if theWSNMonitoring Agent receives engineering data from theWSN,
the agent sends the data to the Trending Agent
That part of the scenario could be mapped to structured text as:
inWSNMA?fault from WSN
then outWSNMA!fault to FIRE
else
inengWSNMA?data from WSN
then outengWSNMA!data to TREND
10
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The laws of concurrency would allow us to derive the traces as:
tWSNMA ⊇ {��, �inWSNMA,fault�, �inWSNMA,fault,outWSNMA,fault�}
� {��, �inengWSNMA,data�, �inengWSNMA,data,outWSNMA,data�}
From which, we can infer an equivalent CSP process speciﬁcation as:
WSNMA = inWSNMA?fault → (outWSNMA!fault → SK I P)
| (inengWSNMA?data → outengWSNMA!data → SK I P)
Let us now consider a slightly larger example, the Pager Agent, and illustrate its
implementation in Java. The pager agent sends pages to engineers and controllers
when there is a WSN anomaly and there is no analyst logged on to the system. The
pager agent receives requests from the user interface agent that no analyst is logged
on, gets paging information from the database agent that keeps relevant information
about each user of the system (in this case the analyst’s pager number), and, when
instructed by the user interface agent that the analyst has logged on, stops paging.
These scenarios can be restated in more structured natural language as follows:
if the Pager agent receives a request from the User Interface agent, the
Pager agent sends a request to the database agent for an analyst’s
pager information and puts the message in a list of requests to the
database agent
OR
if the Pager agent receives a pager number from the database agent,
then the pager agent removes the message from the paging queue
and sends a message to the analyst’s pager and adds the analyst to
the list of paged people
OR
if the Pager agent receives a message from the user interface agent
to stop paging a particular analyst, the pager sends a stop-paging
command to the analyst’s pager and removes the analyst from the
paged list
OR
if the Pager agent receives another kind of message, reply to the sender
that the message was not recognized
The above scenarios would then be translated into CSP. The following is a
partial CSP description of the pager agent:
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PAGER_BUSdb_waiting,paged = pager.I in?msg →
case
GET _USER_I N FOdb_waiting,paged,pagee,text
i f msg = (ST ART _PAGI NG, specialist, text)
BEGI N_PAGI NGdb_waiting,paged,in_reply_to_id(msg),pager_num
i f msg = (RETU RN_DAT A.pager_num)
ST OP_CONT ACTdb_waiting,paged,pagee
i f msg = (ST OP_PAGI NG, pagee)
pager.I out(head(msg),UN RECOGN I Z ED)
→ PAGER_BUSdb_waiting,paged
otherwise
This speciﬁcation states that the process PAGER_BUS receives a message on
its “Iin” channel and stores it in a variable called “msg”. Depending on the contents
of the message, one of four different processes is executed. If the message has a
START_PAGING performative, then the GET_USER_INFO process is called with
parameters of the type of specialist to page (pagee) and the text to send the pagee.
If the message has a RETURN_DATA performative with a pagee’s pager number,
then the database has returned a pager number and the BEGIN_PAGING process
is executed with a parameter containing the original message id (used as a key to
the db_waiting set) and the passed-in pager number. The third type of message
that the pager agent might receive is one with a STOP_PAGING performative.
This message contains a request to stop paging a particular specialist (stored in the
pagee parameter). When this message is received, the STOP_PAGING process is
executed with the parameter of the specialist type. If the pager agent receives any
other message than the above three messages, an error message is returned to the
sender of the message (which is the ﬁrst item of the list) stating that the message is
“UNRECOGNIZED”. After this, the PAGER_BUS process is again executed.
5 Application Areas
The motivation for this work was the need for automatic code generation for ultra-
high dependability systems, but the method described in this report is applicable in
a number of other areas. The following areas may ﬁnd signiﬁcant value from the
use of this system.
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Sensor Networks
NASA is currently conducting research and development on sensor networks
for planetary and solar system exploration, as well as to support its Mission to
Planet Earth. In addition to the ANTS mission, a similar mission is being con-
sidered to explore the rings of Saturn. Sensor networks are also being considered
for planetary (e.g., Martian) exploration, to yield valuable scientiﬁc information on
weather and geological aspects. For the Mission to Planet Earth, sensor networks
are already being researched and developed towards capabilities for early warnings
about natural disasters and climate change. With the “system of systems” nature
of sensor networks, the inter-relatedness of these systems all networked together
will create a level of complexity that will require a new level of dependability and
a corresponding new approach to system and software development.
Projected NASA sensor networks are highly distributed autonomous systems
that must operate with a high degree of reliability, especially the solar system and
planetary exploration networks, which cannot (due to large distances) be controlled
in real time from Earth and must operate under extremes of dynamic environmental
conditions. Because of the complexity of these systems, as well as their distributed
and parallel nature, they will have an extremely large state space and will be impos-
sible to test using traditional testing techniques. The more “code” or instructions
that can be generated automatically from a veriﬁably correct model, the less likely
that people will introduce errors during the development process. In addition, the
higher the level of abstraction that developers can work from, as is afforded through
the use of scenarios to describe system behavior, the less likely that a mismatch will
occur between requirements and implementation, and the more likely that the sys-
tem will be validated. Working from a higher level of abstraction will also allow
errors in the system to be more easily caught, because developers can better see the
“big picture” of the system. In addition to allowing complex systems developers
to work at a higher level of abstraction, R2D2C also converts the scenarios into a
formal model that can be analyzed for concurrency-related errors as well as con-
sistency and completeness, in addition to domain-speciﬁc errors.
Expert Systems
We have been studying the potential use of this approach in the development,
maintenance, and veriﬁcation of expert systems. In particular, we have been giv-
ing consideration to using the R2D2C method in verifying the expert system used
in the NASA ground control center for the POLAR spacecraft, which performs
multi-wavelength imaging of the Earth’s aurora. The POLAR ground control ex-
pert system has rules written in the production system CLIPS [GR04] for auto-
mated “lights out” (untended) operation of the spacecraft. A suitable translator
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from CLIPS, rather than natural language, to CSP (or EzyCSP) enables us to use
this technology to examine existing expert system rule bases for consistency, etc.
What has proven to be of great interest, however, is the ability to generate CLIPS
rules from CSP (or EzyCSP), just as we would generate code in Java or C++. PO-
LAR ground control center personnel expect this would be a great beneﬁt because
it would give them a means of capturing expert knowledge, from natural language
description through to CLIPS rules, while maintaining correctness, which hereto-
fore has not been available.
Robotic Operations
As pointed out earlier, the “code” generated by this approach need not be
speciﬁcally code in a programming language. To this end, we have been exper-
imenting with generating code to control robotic devices. Perhaps more interesting
is the use of this approach to investigate the validity and correctness of procedures
for complex robotic assembly or repair tasks. We have begun exploratory work in
this direction, to validate procedures from the Hubble Robotic Servicing Mission
(HRSM)—for example, the procedures for replacement of cameras, etc., on the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST).
6 Related Work
Harel [Har01] [HM03] has advocated scenario-based programming through UML
use cases and play-in scenarios. This work differs in that it uses scenarios in
the form of structured text that is easily understandable by engineers and non-
engineers. In addition, the results of converting the structured text to traces and
then from traces to a formal model allows us to use a wide range of formal methods
tools (e.g., model checkers), which can be used to verify and validate the system.
NASA Ames has been working on the automatic translation of UML use cases
to executable code, and they report success in using the approach on large applica-
tions [WSK03]. Our approach is different, however, in that we are not limited to
UML use cases, nor to natural language. R2D2C will work equally well with any
input mechanism whereby requirements can be represented as scenarios, and traces
extracted. Our approach works equally well with graphical, mathematical, and tex-
tual requirements representations. More importantly, the key to our approach, and
what makes it invaluable for high-dependability applications, is the full formal ba-
sis, and complete mathematical tractability from requirements through to code. To
our knowledge, no other currently available automated development methodology
can make this claim.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
R2D2C is a unique approach to the automatic derivation of ultra-high dependability
systems. It is unique in that it supports fully (mathematically) tractable develop-
ment from requirements elicitation through to automatic code generation (and back
again). While other approaches have supported various subsets of the development
lifecycle, there has been heretofore a “jump” in deriving (from the requirements)
the formal model that is a prerequisite for sound automatic code generation. Yet,
R2D2C is a simple approach, combining techniques and notations that are well
understood, well tried and tested, and trusted. The novelty of the approach, and
the part of the approach that achieves continuity in the development process, is the
use of a theorem prover to reverse the laws of concurrency, and to achieve levels of
inference that would be impossible for a human being to perform on all but trivial
systems.
It is our contention that R2D2C, and other approaches that similarly provide
mathematical soundness throughout the development lifecycle will:
• Dramatically increase assurance of system success by ensuring
– that requirements are complete and consistent
– that implementations are true to the requirements
– that automatically coded systems are bug-free
– that implementation behavior is as expected
• Decrease costs and schedule impacts of ultra-high dependability systems
through automated development
• Decrease re-engineering costs and delays
Future work will include improving the quality of the embedding of CSP in
ACL2, and optimizing the embedding for efﬁciency. We plan a plethora of support
tools to allow us to easily change the level of abstraction in a formal model, to
visualize various systemmodels and changes in those models, and to aid in tracking
changes through the development process (or the reverse engineering process). We
plan to enhance our existing prototype to support the full version of R2D2C, to
make it into a fully functional robust prototype, and to apply it to more signiﬁcant
examples than the one presented in this paper. Planned enhancements to the "short-
cut" version of R2D2C include incorporating additional front-end translation from
various system description languages, including rule-based system languages (e.g.,
CLIPS).
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